Though the situation in Kashmir remains fraught, the immediate crisis has subsided. Amidst calls from otherwise thoughtful and responsible commentators about granting Kashmir the right of self-determination one needs to carefully examine the meaning and the case for self-determination.

To begin with, international law does not equate self-determination with secession. The requirements of self-determination may be met through the broad provisions of democracy and federalism. More specifically, ethnic groups may be granted varying degrees of linguistic and cultural rights and programmes of positive discrimination. Their demands may also be satisfied through particular mechanisms for political autonomy and devolution.

On specific occasions, the Indian state has depicted a remarkable capacity for fashioning such arrangements ranging from the creation of linguistically-based states to that of local district councils. These arrangements could be forged because those making the demands were willing to abandon the secessionist agenda and take part in a democratic process of negotiation and compromise.

Apart from the tendency of many to conflate secession with self-determination it is important to recognise that international law does not provide explicit guidance on the conditions under which ethnic groups may demand the right to secede. Given the ambiguity surrounding the subject it may be useful to sketch out some general conditions under which the international community may recognise the need for secession.

Having done so, it may then be useful to apply these general principles to India's past record and present circumstances in Kashmir.

Despite the lack of clear-cut, widely accepted principles under international law which might allow secession, it's possible to spell out some guidelines that should secure wide international acceptance. An ethnic group threatened with the imminent prospect of genocide may well claim the right of secession to forestall its occurrence.

Similarly, they may also demand that right when a state pursues genocidal policies. Indeed such was the claim of the Bengali population of East Pakistan in the wake of the brutal Pakistani military crackdown on March 26, 1971.


Ethnic groups can also advance a similar claim when a majority ethnic group seeks to systematically dispossess them of their ancestral lands through a policy of what a noted scholar and commentator, Kanti Bajpai, has termed “ethnic flooding”.

In many ways, China's policies in Tibet over an extended period of time meet that standard. China has not only systematically repressed the Tibetan population but has also sought through the pursuit of a policy of population transfer to alter the demography of Tibet.

Over time, Tibet may well become a Han-dominated region if China continues to encourage internal migration with a view towards changing the demography of the area.

There is no gainsaying the errors and follies that the Indian state, regardless of regime, has engaged in Jammu and Kashmir. It would be easy to provide any such catalogue of political mismanagement and skulduggery. That said none of the flawed policy choices of the Indian state come close to meeting the standards spelled out above.

There is little question that the Indian state has used harsh and even cruel counter-insurgency tactics in dealing with the rebellion that broke out in the state in December 1989. However, these policies and tactics have been hardly uniform and have not relied solely on a “mailed fist” strategy.

Instead, on a number of occasions, it has also offered a “velvet glove” to those who have evinced any interest in negotiations short of secession. Consequently, despite the florid prose of many polemicists and apologists for Pakistan, the actions of the Indian state, while worthy of criticism, do not even approach the standard of a genocidal policy.

Has the Indian state sought to pursue a policy of “ethnic flooding”? Once again, the evidence simply does not stand up to scrutiny. Despite much clamour from the right-wing spectrum of Indian politics, all governments have refused to abolish Article 370 which confers certain unique provisions on Jammu and Kashmir. It is most unlikely that any future government would tamper with this critical constitutional provision.

Consequently, the charge that the Indian state harbours sinister designs to change the ethnic composition of the state is simply a chimerical claim.

Finally, those demanding secession from the Indian state have to answer a simple but compelling question. Are they prepared to grant the same rights and privileges that they have hitherto enjoyed, however fitfully, from the Indian state to the minorities in their midst? Even a careful reading of their statements, not to mention their actions, suggests otherwise.

On the contrary, the viciousness of the insurgents and the political rhetoric of the Hurriyat makes clear that “nested minorities” — minorities within minorities — would have few, if any, rights in the seceding state. Under these circumstances the Indian state simply cannot afford to abnegate its constitutional duties towards these hapless minorities.

Instead, it has every obligation to protect them from a potentially disastrous fate.

The recent wave of protests and the substantial deployment of Indian security forces in the state designed to contain and quell them at considerable human and material costs has led insightful and mainstream commentators to suggest that India simply allow the disaffected population of Kashmir to go their own way. Their arguments, though well-meaning, nevertheless fail to address the questions that need to be answered before one equates self-determination with secession.

The writer is director of the India Studies Program at Indiana University, Bloomington.